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ABSTRACT: The concept of minimum rules is inextricably linked to the approximation of criminal norms 
in the European Union. In the field of procedural criminal law, the adoption of minimum rules sup-
ports the need to facilitate mutual recognition and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
This Article seeks to introduce the reader to the world of minimum rules. In order to understand what 
it means to have minimum rules in a criminal law context, it is necessary to discuss about the origins, 
the development, the use and the role of minimum rules within this particular context. Following a 
complete depiction of the way in which minimum rules function in the field of procedural criminal 
law, the question arises: can Member States go beyond minimum rules? This Article attempts a com-
prehensive answer to the question of national discretion, arguing for the existence of different limits 
that can confine the discretion of the national legislator to go beyond minimum rules, and advocating 
the need for an ad hoc assessment of Member States’ discretion. 
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I. A brief journey to the world of minimum rules  
Despite constituting for many years terra incognita for the European Union, the area of 
criminal law has known a flourishing legislative production over the past years. The efforts 
of the European legislator to approximate criminal norms in the EU have given rise to a 
substantial body of legislation that signals a shift from the initial reluctance of Member 
States to confer the relevant competence to the EU.1 In this context, the concept of mini-
mum rules has become central to the harmonisation of both the substantive and proce-
dural criminal law in the EU, as well to the approximation of criminal sanctions.2  
Minimum rules are part of the efforts to create the common legal language of the 
European Union. In the field of EU criminal law, they have known a life of more than 
twenty years, but still it remains unclear what it means to have minimum rules in a 
criminal law context. This Article seeks to introduce the reader to the world of minimum 
rules, focusing predominantly on procedural criminal law. As a point of departure, the 
emergence of minimum rules in the field of procedural criminal law is being discussed, 
offering an overview of the different functions that they fulfil within this particular con-
text. From there, the focus is shifted towards the question of the discretion of Member 
States to go beyond minimum rules. Answering the question of national discretion and 
revealing the limits that apply to the discretionary powers of the national legislator is a 
necessary step towards the better understanding of the vague concept of minimum 
rules that guides the criminal law competence of the EU. 
i.1. The origins of minimum rules 
The concept of minimum rules is inextricably linked to the European integration pro-
cess. Originating from the early days of the internal market, minimum rules are fre-
quently adopted in all different areas of EU law.3 In the context of EU criminal law, min-
imum rules represent the youngest member of the family, as their first treaty-based 
appearance can be traced in the text of the Treaty of Amsterdam.4 Since then, the use 
of minimum rules has gained a central position in the criminal law competence of the 
 
1 J. ÖBERG, EU Procedural Criminal Law after Lisbon, in J. OUWERKERK, J. ALTENA, J. ÖBERG, S. MIETTINEN (eds), 
The Future of EU Criminal Justice Policy and Practice, Leiden: Brill, Nijhoff, 2019, p. 228.  
2 In this Article, the terms “harmonisation” and “approximation” are used interchangeably. Despite 
the subtle differences between these two terms, the EU legislator does not seem to acknowledge differ-
ent connotations. See further, A. KLIP, European Criminal Law, An Integrative Approach, Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2016, p. 38.  
3 The use of minimum rules originated in the internal market context. In fact, the first traces of the 
concept of minimum rules date back to the 1960s, when the adoption of common minimum provisions 
sought to establish a common market for fruits and vegetables. Subsequently, the use of minimum rules 
spread quickly to all different areas of EU law before entering the field of criminal law.  
4 Art. K.3 of the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities and certain related acts.  
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European Union, constituting the steering wheel for the harmonisation of both substan-
tive and procedural criminal law.  
Since the first days of the competence of the EU to intervene in the sphere of criminal 
law, the need to ground a common understanding among Member States and thereby 
facilitate mutual recognition and judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters was 
seen as an essential step.5 To that end, bringing forward a certain degree of harmonisa-
tion of national norms was perceived as the necessary prerequisite for mutual recogni-
tion.6 However, the reluctance of Member States to confer the relevant competence to 
the EU and the concerns about preserving the national identity of criminal law,7 resulted 
in limiting the competence of the EU to the adoption of minimum rules.8  
Following the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht that provided the necessary legal 
basis for the Union’s competence to legislate in criminal matters,9 the first initiatives 
that referred to the concept of minimum rules appeared in the mid-1990s.10 Despite 
the fact that the concept of minimum rules was not explicitly mentioned in the text of 
the Treaty, the European Commission already acknowledged since that time the need 
to establish a “set of minimum rules for the establishment of direct and efficient judicial 
collaboration”.11 This statement constitutes one of the first references to the concept of 
minimum rules in the field of criminal law, representing an attempt on behalf of the Eu-
ropean Commission to push Member States to proceed with the development of cross-
border judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
Subsequently, the Treaty of Amsterdam codified the adoption of minimum rules as 
regards the definition of criminal offences, leaving however out of the picture the rele-
 
5 European Council, conclusions of the Presidency, Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999.  
6 M. KLAMERT, What We Talk About When We Talk About Harmonisation, in Cambridge Yearbook of Euro-
pean Legal Studies, 2015, p. 360 et seq. 
7 See J. OUWERKERK, J. ALTENA, J. ÖBERG, S. MIETTINEN (eds), The Future of EU Criminal Justice Policy, cit. 
8 On the relation between European criminal law and national identity, see M. HILDEBRANDT, European 
Criminal Law and European Identity, in Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2007, p. 57 et seq. 
9 Art. K.1 TEU, 1992. However, this was not the first time that the European authorities decided to inter-
vene in the sphere of criminal law. References to the need for cross-border cooperation in criminal matters 
date long before the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, and can be traced back to the TREVI group, 
which put in 1975 on the agenda the need for cross-border cooperation to effectively combat crime. 
10 For instance, in 1996 the European Commission issued a communication with regards to the 
illegal and harmful content on the internet, where the non-territorial nature of the offence called for a 
solution that would go beyond the borders of Member States. The Commission underlined the necessity 
for Member States to define certain minimum common standards in their criminal legislation, in order to 
“avoid loopholes for criminal activities”. See Communication COM(1996) 487 final of 16 October 1996 
from the Commission on Illegal and harmful content on the Internet. 
11 The Commission’s annual report for the year 1994 notes that there is a need for a “minimum plat-
form of basic principles” that would efficiently protect the Community’s finances. See Commission, Annu-
al Report COM(1995) 98 final of 29 March 1995, Protecting the Community’s financial interests. The fight 
against fraud, p. 18.  
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vant competence for procedural criminal law.12 Hence, despite the fact that the criminal 
law competence of the EU was narrower at that time, the European authorities 
acknowledged the need for a common response to crime. Regardless of this nuance, 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam signals major developments in the field 
of EU criminal law, with the establishment of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
and the codification in the text of the Treaty of the previous legislative practice with re-
gards to the adoption of minimum rules. Since then, the proliferation of EU documents 
that deal with matters of criminal law is indisputable, while the concept of minimum 
rules is being widely used as the main legislative tool towards the harmonisation of 
criminal norms and therethrough the effective combat of crime.13 
i.2. The current legal framework  
The current legal framework is shaped by the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
was meant to beckon a new era for criminal legislation in Europe.14 In particular, Arts 82 
and 83 TFEU dictate that the harmonising competence of the EU in the field of substan-
tive and procedural criminal law can be exercised only through the adoption of mini-
mum rules, making, thus, minimum rules the sole harmonising tool at the hands of the 
European legislator.15 Focusing on procedural criminal law, the competence of the Eu-
ropean legislator to adopt minimum rules that approximate criminal procedural norms 
and seek to harmonise procedural safeguards in the EU, constitutes a novelty in rela-
tion to the previous EU Treaties. Therefore, it is crucial to have a closer look at the legal 
basis of Art. 82 TFEU, in an attempt to pave the way towards a better understanding of 
the use of minimum rules in this particular context. Additionally, reciting the provisions 
 
12 Indeed, the criminal law competence of the European Union was much narrower under the provisions 
of Art. K.3 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, allowing only for the establishment of minimum rules in the field of 
substantive criminal law and only in relation with specifically mentioned crime areas. In particular, Art. K.3 was 
referring to “progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent ele-
ments of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking”.  
13 See, for instance, the 1999 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how to best imple-
ment the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice, where it is 
noted that criminal behaviour should be approached in an “equally efficient way throughout the Union” 
and that major criminal areas “should be subject of minimum common rules relating to the constituent 
elements of criminal acts and should be pursued with the same vigour wherever they take place”. See 
Council and Commission Action Plan of 23 January 1999 on how to best implement the provision of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice. 
14 Among the most important structural changes that the Treaty of Lisbon brought forward in this 
field, was the abolishment of the complex cross-pillar character of EU criminal law. See E. HERLIN-KARNELL, 
EU Competence in Criminal Law after Lisbon, in A. BIONDI, P. EECKHOUT, S. RIPLEY (eds), European Union Law 
after the Treaty of Lisbon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 329 et seq. 
15 Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the Europe-
an Community. In particular, Arts 82 and 83 TFEU provide the legal basis for the harmonisation of sub-
stantive and procedural criminal law in the EU. 
From the Ground up: The Use of Minimum Rules in EU Procedural Criminal Law 1293 
of Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU allows us to pinpoint the components that are essential to an-
swering the question about the discretion of Member States to go beyond minimum 
rules. Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU reads as follows: “To the extent necessary to facilitate mutu-
al recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the European Parliament and the 
Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, establish minimum rules. Such rules shall take into account the differences 
between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States”,16 whereas the last 
fragment of Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU adds that: “Adoption of the minimum rules referred to 
in this paragraph shall not prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing a 
higher level of protection for individuals”.17 
The first thing that becomes apparent is that the envisaged approach towards the 
harmonisation of procedural criminal law in the EU is limited to the adoption of mini-
mum rules, which may only be adopted to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual 
recognition and cooperation. This means that the scope of adopting minimum rules in 
the field of procedural criminal law is being significantly narrowed down by the text of 
the Treaty, which attributes a supportive role to minimum rules.18 In other words, with 
the primary objective in the field of procedural criminal law being the facilitation of mu-
tual recognition and cross-border cooperation, the use of minimum rules has an auxil-
iary purpose to fulfil. The exact role and the position of minimum rules within this par-
ticular context will be discussed further below.  
II. Orchestrating the harmonisation of procedural criminal norms 
in the EU 
The use of minimum rules in the context of procedural criminal law reflects the need 
for a common set of procedural safeguards that would be equally respected through-
out the Union. By creating a common legal language, minimum rules build the ground 
that supports the elimination of obstacles in mutual recognition and cross-border co-
operation in criminal matters. Bearing this in mind, there is a tight relationship between 
minimum rules and mutual recognition, with the former being justified in light of the 
latter. In fact, minimum rules were initially conceived as a tool that would merely re-
move the obstacles in cross-border cooperation that could arise from the divergences 
 
16 Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU. 
17 Ibid. 
18 The use of minimum rules in procedural criminal law is further limited by the Treaty, given that the 
adoption of minimum rules may be pursued only with regards to three legislative areas: i) the mutual 
admissibility of evidence between Member States; ii) the rights of individuals in criminal proceedings; iii) 
the rights of the victims of crime. Despite the fact that an additional, all-embracing area, allows the adop-
tion of minimum rules with regards to “any other specific aspects of criminal procedure”, this has not 
been invoked yet. 
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in national law.19 However, throughout the development of EU criminal law, minimum 
rules were soon transformed into a harmonising tool that seeks to bring forward an 
“ever closer Union” and strengthen procedural guarantees in the EU.20  
It stems from the above that the adoption of minimum rules in the field of proce-
dural criminal law has a strong functional character.21 More specifically, this functional 
character means that the European legislator adopts minimum rules in relation to fur-
ther objectives of the EU, which in the case of procedural criminal law is primarily the 
facilitation of mutual recognition and cooperation. As a result, the harmonisation of 
procedural norms through the adoption of minimum rules does not represent an au-
tonomous, self-standing objective of the European Union.22 On the contrary, it is justi-
fied only to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition and cross-border co-
operation, as Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU clearly dictates.  
Acknowledging that minimum rules constitute a key harmonising tool in the legisla-
tor’s toolbox, with a strong functional character, is essential in order to understand 
what it means to have minimum rules in a criminal law context. Overall, the establish-
ment of minimum rules in the field of procedural criminal law seeks to close the gap be-
tween diverse national provisions and establish an equal level of protection throughout 
the European Union, guaranteeing that a minimum set of procedural safeguards are 
respected in all the Member States. This need to guarantee a level-playing field in the 
EU is essential to the functioning of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
Furthermore, the adoption of minimum rules satisfies a series of ancillary objectives 
that are adjunct to their primary role as a harmonising tool. For instance, having common 
minimum standards across the EU impedes the creation of safe-havens and delimits the 
risk of forum-shopping phenomena.23 Most importantly, the adoption of minimum rules 
in the field of criminal law showcases the desire to preserve the national character of 
criminal law, which, as already mentioned, is considered a sensitive issue of national sov-
 
19 J. ÖBERG, Trust in the Law? Mutual Recognition as a Justification to Domestic Criminal Procedure, in Eu-
ropean Constitutional Law Review, 2020, p. 33 et seq. 
20 European Council Resolution of 30 November 2009 on a roadmap for strengthening procedural 
rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings. 
21 J. OUWERKERK, EU Competence in the Area of Procedural Criminal Law: Functional vs. Self-Standing Ap-
proximation of Procedural Rights and their Progressive Effect on the Charter’s Scope of Application, in European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2019, p. 89 et seq. 
22 Ouwerkerk argues that despite some recent developments in the field of EU criminal procedural 
law that indicate the tendency of the EU legislator to adopt minimum rules also for autonomous reasons, 
“a self-standing body of EU procedural rights cannot legitimately be realized under the too limited func-
tionalist scope of Article 82(2) TFEU”. See ibid., p. 94. 
23 Although this aspect might seem more relevant to the harmonisation of substantive criminal law, 
it is equally important for procedural norms. Within the borderless Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
and due to the non-territorial character of several offences, it is crucial to avoid circumstances where var-
ious forms of criminal behaviour can benefit from loopholes in the national criminal justice system and 
take advantage of the differences in local legislations, in an attempt to, inter alia, avoid prosecution.  
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ereignty. The need for a balanced and respectful approach towards the harmonisation of 
procedural criminal law is enshrined in the text of the Treaty of Lisbon, which notes that 
the establishment of common minimum rules “shall take into account the differences be-
tween the legal traditions and systems of the Member States”.24 In that sense, minimum 
rules are able to compromise the need for the establishment of a borderless Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, while at the same time preserve national identity and the 
fundamental aspects of domestic criminal law.25 The adoption of minimum rules is a way 
to acknowledge the fact that national diversity is a reality that often calls for different solu-
tions. In fact, the concept of minimum rules constitutes the sole harmonising option that 
allows for the preservation of national identity.26 Contrary to the rest of the aforemen-
tioned functions, which in theory could be also pursued through the adoption of maxi-
mum harmonisation provisions, the establishment of minimum rules is the only available 
option that ensures respect for the diversity in national penal traditions. Hence, the adop-
tion of minimum rules establishes a common level of understanding within the European 
Union, without burying national differences in the sand. 
III. Minimum rules and the question of national discretion 
Following a closer look at the concept of minimum rules, it is now time to focus on the 
question of national discretion, namely the question of whether Member States can go 
beyond EU wide minimum rules.27 National discretion is here understood as the 
amount of freedom that the national legislator has – or should have – when implement-
ing minimum rules in domestic legislation.28 Indeed, during the implementation of min-
imum rules in national criminal law, the national legislator is able to go beyond the 
common minimum provisions and exceed the wording of the Directive, in an attempt to 
 
24 Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU.  
25 See also Art. 4, para. 2, TEU that establishes the need to respect national identities and, therefore, 
national penal traditions as well. In particular, Art. 4, para. 2, TEU states that “the Union shall respect the 
equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional”. Additionally, in the field of procedural criminal law, 
the significance of preserving national identity is further enshrined in Art. 83, para. 3, TFEU that provides 
for an “emergency break”, in cases where Member States consider that a proposed draft affects 
fundamental aspects of their criminal justice system. 
26 The establishment of minimum rules is the least intrusive option available, especially in relation to 
the alternatives of maximum harmonisation and the unification of national laws.  
27 Following Arts 82 and 83 TFEU, read together with Art. 288 TFEU, minimum rules in the field of EU 
criminal law may be adopted only in the form of directives that are binding to the result to be achieved, 
but leave to national authorities the choice of forms and methods. 
28 A second level of national discretion refers to the discretion of national judicial authorities to in-
terpret minimum rules and grant them a broader (or narrower) content than the one intended by the 
European legislature. This Article discusses only the first level of national discretion, i.e. legislative discre-
tion, and not judicial discretion.  
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enhance procedural safeguards. This kind of legislative discretion, which is inherent to 
the concept of minimum rules, should not be confused with the leeway that the legal 
instrument of the directive awards in any case to the national legislator to adapt the 
transposition of EU law into national legislation.29  
It is crucial to identify the element of national discretion in all the instruments that 
introduce minimum rules, in a sense that we cannot talk about the existence of mini-
mum rules without discussing about the amount of discretion they award to Member 
States. As already mentioned, minimum rules provide the common ground upon which 
Member States are able to build. Hence, without being able to imagine, at least in princi-
ple, the fact that Member States have the discretion to go beyond minimum rules, then 
we are no longer talking about minimum rules, but instead we are referring to maxi-
mum rules. In other words, if the rule adopted by the European legislator does not al-
low the national legislator to exceed it, then it is not a minimum rule, but a maximum 
one, setting both the regulatory floor and ceiling at the same time. What would be the 
point of differentiating between minimum and maximum rules, if we strip the first ones 
of the element of national discretion, i.e. if we deprive the national legislator of the pos-
sibility to go beyond the minimum common ground? 
Additionally, it is worth reminding that the term “minimum” does not refer to the 
content of the rule, but to the fact that the adopted rule sets the common ground for all 
Member States. In other words, the word “minimum” serves as a reminder of the dis-
cretion of Member States to build upon this common ground, which represents the 
least that should be done, without imposing a priori an upper limit. 
The argument in favour of the discretion of Member States to go beyond minimum 
rules has its strongest foundation in the Treaty of Lisbon. A close reading of Art. 82, pa-
ra. 2, TFEU suggests that the discretion of Member States is granted by the text of the 
Treaty itself. More specifically, Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU makes it clear that the establish-
ment of minimum rules “shall not prevent Member States from maintaining or intro-
ducing a higher level of protection for individuals”.30 This is a clear-cut provision that 
introduces a one-way requirement, a unidirectional obligation.31 It obliges Member 
States to establish the prescribed minimum level of protection, but at the same time it 
provides the possibility to exceed that minimum level and introduce higher standards. 
This grammatical interpretation of the text of the Treaty constitutes the first line of in-
terpretation and provides an initial answer to the question of national discretion. 
 
29 J. HARTMANN, Discretion in EU Directives: Enhancing Political Legitimacy Within the EU’s Multi-Level Legal 
System, presented at the Sixth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 13-15 September 2012, available 
at ssrn.com.  
30 Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU. 
31 P. ASP, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence of the EU, Stockholm: Skrifter utgivna av juridiska 
fakulteten vid Stockholms universitet, 2012, p. 117.  
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Moreover, the wording of Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU differentiates between “maintain-
ing” and “introducing” a higher level of protection. The first instance acts as a confirma-
tion of the non-regression clause, which reminds to Member States that the implemen-
tation of EU law cannot serve as an excuse for lowering the national standards of pro-
tection, and, at the same time, allows Member States with higher procedural safeguards 
to preserve those higher standards. In other words, Member States that provided for a 
high level of procedural rights before the adoption of the common minimum rules, they 
cannot lower their established level of protection in the excuse of streamlining their leg-
islation with the EU-wide minimum rules. Hence, the text of the Treaty acknowledges 
the fact that existing national procedural safeguards may be higher than the common 
minimum rules and, therefore, recognizes implicitly the discretion of Member States to 
deviate in that direction. However, the second instance, i.e. the possibility of “introduc-
ing” a higher level of protection, is an explicit confirmation of the discretion of Member 
States to go beyond minimum rules, even when there is no prior national legislation on 
the matter. The text of the Treaty notes loud and clear that the adoption of minimum 
rules should not impede the desire of the Member States to guarantee a higher level of 
procedural safeguards and defence rights in their respective jurisdictions.  
The above viewpoint that understands minimum rules as allowing Member States 
to go beyond them in the field of procedural criminal law is widely accepted by several 
authors in the field of EU criminal law. Indeed, it seems that there is an agreement 
about the possibility of Member States to go beyond minimum rules in this particular 
context.32 Specifically, most contributions seem to agree that minimum rules in the field 
of procedural law should be interpreted as establishing a common set of procedural 
safeguards that allows Member States to exceed them in order to award a higher level 
of protection. For instance, according to Hans Nilsson, “real minimum rules” exist in the 
field of procedural criminal law,33 allowing for a higher level of procedural safeguards to 
be adopted by the Member States. Accordingly, Valsamis Mitsilegas places himself on 
the same side of the debate, advocating for the freedom of Member States to adopt 
higher provisions in the field of procedural criminal law.34 
All in all, minimum rules in the field of procedural criminal law are commonly inter-
preted as allowing Member States to go beyond them and introduce higher procedural 
safeguards in their respective jurisdictions. However, is the question of national discre-
tion in the field of procedural criminal law such a straightforward case? 
 
32 The question of national discretion has troubled EU criminal law scholars mostly with regards to 
substantive criminal law, where antipodal points have been supported. See, inter alia, the contributions of 
H.G. NILSSON, How to Combine Minimum Rules with Maximum Legal Certainty, in Europarättslig Tidskrift, 2011, 
p. 665 et seq.; V. MITSILEGAS, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon: Rights, Trust and the Transformation of Justice in 
Europe, Oxford: Hart, 2016, pp. 62-63; P. ASP, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence, cit., p.110 et seq. 
33 H.G. NILSSON, How to Combine Minimum Rules with Maximum Legal Certainty, cit., p. 675. 
34 V. MITSILEGAS, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon, cit., p. 63. 
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IV. Raising barriers to national discretion  
The uncertainty about what constitutes a minimum rule inevitably gives rise to the un-
certainty about whether Member States can go beyond them. The lines around the 
question of national discretion seem to be thin and urge us to approach this topic with 
cautiousness. One may reasonably ask whether the aforementioned textual interpreta-
tion of the concept of minimum rules is enough to provide a definitive answer to the 
question of national discretion. Accordingly, the question arises whether there are any 
factors that tend to limit the discretion of Member States to go beyond minimum rules 
in EU criminal procedural law. 
Alas, providing an answer to the question of national discretion has to penetrate 
several lines of interpretation that go well beyond the text of the Treaty. In general, the 
grammatical interpretation is only one way of reading and understanding a legal docu-
ment. Although it serves as the first line of interpretation, what needs to be added here 
is the scope of the adoption of minimum rules in the field of procedural criminal law, 
i.e. a teleological interpretation of the concept of minimum rules. 
If one departs from the text of the Treaty and takes a closer look at the rationale 
behind the adoption of minimum rules, alongside the way they function within the con-
text of procedural criminal law, then it becomes apparent that the discretion of Mem-
ber States to go beyond minimum rules is not without certain limits. These limits arise 
from the functional character of minimum rules in the context of procedural criminal 
law,35 and their position within the overall architecture of the European legal order.  
As already discussed, the adoption of minimum rules under the legal basis of Art. 
82 TFEU does not have an autonomous character; it is justified only when it serves the 
purpose of the facilitation of mutual recognition and cross-border cooperation in crimi-
nal matters. As a result, the functional character of minimum rules introduces a first 
limit to the discretion of Member States to unequivocally surpass the common mini-
mum provisions. Although Member States remain in principle free to go beyond mini-
mum rules, any supplementary provisions have to fulfil the same objective as the one 
that justified their adoption in the first place. Indeed, when the reason for the adoption 
of minimum rules is the facilitation of mutual recognition, it would be odd to advocate 
for the right of Member States to go beyond minimum rules in a way that would un-
dermine mutual recognition and cooperation. Hence, a contrario sensu, the discretion of 
Member States needs to be confined within the limited scope defined by minimum 
rules and, thus, any supplementary national provisions may not raise disproportionate 
obstacles to the facilitation of mutual recognition and cooperation. In other words, the 
raison d'être of a given rule dictates how far the rule can go and how far Member States 
can exceed the wording of that rule.  
 
35 See supra, section II.  
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The conclusion that the rationale behind the adoption of minimum rules dictates 
the limits to national discretion reflects the position of the Court of Justice. In illustra-
tion of the position of the Court of Justice, two cases are discussed here, in an attempt 
to show how the Court weights the scope and the extent of national discretion against 
the forum where minimum rules are going to be applied. 
In Melloni,36 the Court of Justice issued a judgement that sparked a lot of debate and 
generated abundant commentaries in the field of EU law.37 Dealing with the question of 
the relation between EU standards and higher national (constitutional) standards, the Mel-
loni case has a role to play in answering this Article’s question: Can Member States go be-
yond minimum rules in the field of procedural criminal law? Spoiler alert: the Luxembourg 
Court argued against the higher national standards of protection.  
The Melloni case is significant for the constitutional architecture of the European 
Union as it provides a firm answer in favour of the primacy of EU law.38 In particular, the 
Court was asked to judge whether the higher standards of protection provided by the 
Spanish Constitution with regard to the right to a fair trial and in absentia judgements, 
were compatible with the common standards of the EU, or whether they were raising 
obstacles to mutual recognition and judicial cooperation, vis-à-vis the execution of a Eu-
ropean Arrest Warrant. In other words, the question referred to the Court was, inter 
alia, a question about the primacy of EU law, asked this time in the context of mutual 
recognition and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.39  
The decision of the Court of Justice was pretty straightforward: the existence of 
higher national standards of protection cannot violate the effectiveness of EU law, by 
raising obstacles that undermine the efficiency of judicial cooperation and thereby un-
dermine the principle of supremacy of EU law.40 Leaving aside the constitutional impli-
cations of the judgement, it becomes clear that the Court does not see with a friendly 
eye the discretion of Member States to deviate from minimum rules, even when such 
deviation consists in maintaining prior constitutional standards. In fact, the significance 
that the Court of Justice attributes to the primacy of EU law and the desire to circum-
scribe any higher standards that might raise obstacles to the effective application of EU 
law, reflects a move from an intergovernmental way of government to supranational-
 
36 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2013, case C-399/11, Melloni [GC]. 
37 See, inter alia, V. FRANSSEN, Melloni as a Wake-up Call – Setting Limits to Higher National Standards of 
Fundamental Rights’ Protection, in European Law Blog, 10 March 2014, europeanlawblog.eu; N. DE BOER, 
Addressing Rights Divergences under the Charter: Melloni, in Common Market Law Review, 2013, p.1083 et seq.  
38 L.F.M. BESSELINK, The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict after Melloni, in European Law Review, 2014, 
p. 531 et seq.  
39 L. BACHMAIER WINTER, Bypassing or Intensifying the Dialogue between Courts? The impact of Melloni at 
the National Level, in V. MITSILEGAS, A. DI MARTINO, L. MANCANO (eds), The Court of Justice and European Crimi-
nal Law: Leading Cases in a Contextual Analysis, Oxford: Hart, 2019, p. 404 et seq. 
40 Melloni [GC], cit., para. 55 et seq. 
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ism, this time in the field of criminal law, with new principles and obligations coming in-
to play that inevitably limit the margin of national discretion.  
On a different occasion, in the Covaci case,41 the Court was asked to interpret the 
provisions of Directive 2010/64/EU42 and Directive 2012/13/EU.43 More specifically, the 
questions referred to the Court of Justice were relevant to the conformity of the Ger-
man legislation with the requirements of Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpre-
tation and translation vis-à-vis the language of the proceedings. Additionally, under the 
German law, a person without a fixed address in Germany was obliged to appoint 
someone with a German address in order to receive formal documents, and the refer-
ring court was in doubt about the conformity of this particular provision with the re-
quirements of Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information.44  
In examining the case at hand, the Court of Justice was called to determine whether 
Arts 2 and 3 of Directive 2010/64/EU allow the German legislator to provide that the fill-
ing of written objections can be done only in the German language, excluding thus the 
possibility for foreigners to lodge a complaint in another language. Although such a re-
striction was permissible under Art. 3 of the Directive,45 the Court took a step further 
and referred to the broader context and the objectives that the Directive seeks to fulfil, 
namely the establishment of high procedural safeguards throughout the EU.46 Accord-
ing to Advocate General Bot,47 the concept of minimum rules should not be understood 
as meaning “minor rules”, namely rules that enclose low regulatory levels and have a 
minimum content. In his view, what minimum rules actually mean is that they consti-
tute rules that encapsulate the fundamental principles of procedural criminal law and 
reflect the shared values that should be equally respected throughout the European 
Union.48 Following the same line of reasoning, the Court explicitly noted that the provi-
 
41 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 October 2015, case C-216/14, Covaci. 
42 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the 
right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. 
43 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right 
to information in criminal proceedings. 
44 For a detailed analysis of the case, see S. LAMBERIGTS, Case C-216/14 Covaci – Minimum Rules, yet Ef-
fective Protection?, 13 November 2015, available at europeanlawblog.eu. 
45 Art. 3 of Directive 2010/64/EU, cit., mainly refers to the right of the suspects or accused persons to re-
ceive a written translation of the documents that are essential to the criminal proceedings and therefore cru-
cial for the effective application of the right to a fair trial. On the contrary, Art. 3 does not make any reference 
to the possibility to file a complaint in a different language than the language of the official proceedings.  
46 Covaci, cit., para. 29. 
47 Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 7 May 2015, case C-216/14, Covaci. 
48 Ibid., para. 55: “First, the expression ‘minimum rules’, to which I personally prefer the expression 
‘non-derogable rules’, must not be interpreted, as is too often the case, and not without ulterior motives, 
in a simplistic manner as referring to minor rules. As has just been explained, they are in fact an essential 
foundation for procedural principles which, in criminal proceedings, ensure the application of and re-
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sions of Directive 2010/64/EU – which is adopted under Art. 82, para. 2, TFEU – contain 
only minimum rules and, therefore, Member States are free to go beyond those rules. 
In the Court’s own words: “Directive 2010/64 lays down only minimum rules, leaving the 
Member States free, as recital 32 in the preamble to that directive states, to extend the 
rights set out in that directive in order to provide a higher level of protection also in sit-
uations not explicitly dealt with in that directive”.49 
In light of the above, although Mr. Covaci was not in principle entitled to the right to 
file an objection in a language other than German, the need for high procedural safe-
guards in the EU that would truly safeguard the right to a fair trial, asks for a broader 
interpretation of the minimum provisions of the Directive. Nonetheless, the Court 
avoids to provide a definitive answer to the question of higher national standards, leav-
ing the final word to the national judge.50 
In comparing the two cases, what seems to matter the most for the Court of Justice 
is the forum of application of minimum rules, and most importantly, the forum of appli-
cation of any higher national provisions. In particular, it is important to examine wheth-
er there is a risk in threatening the principle of mutual recognition and the smooth co-
operation between national authorities. In the Melloni case, the request for a prelimi-
nary ruling is located in the heart of a European Arrest Warrant proceeding, which is the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. According to the Court, the ef-
fective application of EU law and the need to respect the principle of mutual recognition 
render any higher national standards inadmissible, as they raise disproportionate ob-
stacles to the fulfilment of the Union’s objectives. 
On the contrary, in the Covaci case, the question asked to the Court of Justice did not 
entail any elements of mutual recognition or cross-border cooperation. The preliminary 
question was focused on the interpretation of EU law in light of existing national provi-
sions, and whether the latter were compatible with EU law. Therefore, the risk to under-
mine the principle of mutual recognition or impede police and judicial cooperation was 
non-existent. As a result, the Court of Justice considered that Member States are free to go 
beyond minimum rules and provide for higher procedural safeguards, given the fact that 
the purpose of the Directive is to enhance the protection or procedural rights in the EU. 
Building on the Melloni judgement, it becomes apparent that there are certain limits 
that inevitably hold back Member States from exercising their discretion to go beyond 
 
spect for fundamental rights which are the underlying shared values that make the European Union a 
system founded on the rule of law”. 
49 Covaci, cit., para. 48.  
50 Ibid., para. 50: “It is therefore for the referring court, taking into account in particular the charac-
teristics of the procedure applicable to the penalty order concerned in the main proceedings, which were 
noted in paragraph 41 of this judgment, and of the case brought before it, to establish whether the objec-
tion lodged in writing against a penalty order should be considered to be an essential document, the 
translation of which is necessary”. 
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minimum rules. Apart from the teleological interpretation of minimum rules, which nar-
rows down significantly the discretion of Member States, the discretionary powers of 
the national legislator can be eventually circumscribed by a series of factors that arise 
from the position of minimum rules within the European legal order. More specifically, 
the Court of Justice, by referring to the effectiveness of EU law in the Melloni case, refers 
to a set of limits that do not have their foundation in the wording a particular EU in-
strument, but they relate to the position of minimum rules within the broader constitu-
tional architecture of the European Union. This category of limits represents the “exter-
nal” limits to the discretion of Member States. The term “external” should be under-
stood in relation to the source of these limits, as it refers to limits that exist outside the 
wording of a specific instrument.  
Under the category of external limits, one may include all those factors that derive 
from the broader EU law obligations of the Member States. Apart from the aforemen-
tioned need to respect the effectiveness of EU law, limits to the discretion of Member 
States arise from the need to respect the fundamental principles and values of the Eu-
ropean Union, as well as the need to respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Espe-
cially since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the “constitutionalisation of 
EU criminal law”, the general principles of EU law have a much stronger and influential 
role to play in the field of criminal law.51 For instance, the principle of proportionality 
and the adherence to the Charter, point towards the direction that Member States can 
take when they exercise their discretion, meaning that any higher standards can neither 
contradict the provisions of the Charter, nor disrespect the principle of proportionality.  
Subsequently, the discretion of Member States may be subjected to another set of 
limits, which may be called “internal” limits. What should be understood by internal lim-
its is that the text of a particular instrument contains factors that tend to restrict the 
discretion of Member States. To put it in another way, the internal limits refer to situa-
tions in which the text of a directive delimits the discretion of Member States, without 
the need to rely on the aforementioned teleological interpretation, not even to invoke 
the general principles of EU law. This can be done either by de lege limitations, or by de 
facto limitations. The former refers to specific textual provisions that could impede the 
discretion of Member States to go beyond minimum rules. The latter derives from the 
possibly broad and vague wording of a directive that makes the possibility to go beyond 
minimum rules theoretically possible, but practically unrealistic. In that case, Member 
States remain in principle free to exercise their discretion to go beyond minimum rules, 
but they cannot do so, simply because there is nothing that is not already captured by 
the broad and all-embracing content of that particular directive. 
 
51 V. MITSILEGAS, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon, cit., p. 4 et seq.  
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V. Conclusion 
The world of EU minimum rules in the field of criminal law is a small, yet unexplored 
one. The concept of minimum rules has a central role to play in the harmonisation of 
procedural criminal law in the EU, constituting a useful and versatile tool at the hands 
of the European legislator. Unfortunately, despite the fast-growing body of literature in 
the field of EU criminal law, minimum rules and the question of national discretion have 
gained little attention over the years. This Article thus tried to answer one of the funda-
mental questions about the concept of minimum rules, namely the question of the dis-
cretion of Member States to go beyond them.  
In procedural criminal law, minimum rules seek to bring forward the approximation 
of procedural safeguards in the EU and, thereby, facilitate mutual recognition and po-
lice and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The moment minimum rules are being 
introduced, they seek to build a solid common ground. Upon this common ground, 
Member States can build their own set of procedural safeguards and go higher than the 
minimum EU standards. Nonetheless, things are not as clear and straightforward as 
they seem to appear at first sight. In fact, the most appropriate answer to the question 
of national discretion seems to be cagey: Member States should be in principle able to 
exercise their discretion to go beyond minimum rules and adopt provisions that estab-
lish a higher level of procedural safeguards in their respective jurisdictions. This conclu-
sion does not only follow from the wording of Art. 82 TFEU, but it is justified by the core 
characteristics of the concept of minimum rules. 
The key word in the above answer is the word in principle. Member States should be 
in principle awarded the envisaged discretion, but they cannot exercise it unequivocally 
and in all cases. Even though the concept of minimum rules fails to introduce in itself an 
upper limit, it does not mean that such a limit is not there. In fact, the ceiling that delim-
its the discretion of Member States is a rather robust and solid one. The broader con-
text within which minimum rules are being adopted, the rationale behind their adop-
tion, and the overall constitutional architecture of the European Union are factors that 
draw some unbreakable lines. Depending on the instrument at hand and the purpose 
that minimum rules are called to fulfil in each particular case, the final assessment of 
whether Member States can go beyond minimum rules should be made ad hoc. As Sir 
Arthur Conan Doyle used to say, there is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact. 
Despite the initial intuition that urges us to answer the question of national discretion in 
the affirmative, based primarily on the clear wording of Art. 82 TFEU, this Article showed 
that such an answer should be offered with excessive care. 
 
